July 24, 2003
It's a pleasant surprise that Coalition forces finally caught up with Uday and Qusay Hussein. It's
unfortunate (I wouldn't go so far as to say "tragic" when referring to these guys) that they
weren't taken alive, as their trial by the Governing Council's new war crimes tribunal would have
been an excellent opportunity for the Iraqis to begin the process of making a break (and making
peace) with the past.
But the war in Iraq is still far from over, even as other storm clouds grow on the American
horizon. For starters, Saddam himself has yet to be captured or killed, and only when he is will
the spirit of his supporters be broken. American soldiers will continue to die from potshots, and
any sense of normalcy will continue to remain elusive for the Iraqi people. The occupiers are not
leaving any time soon, but neither are the problems faced by them and their Iraqi supporters.
This is doubly unfortunate since America will need all of its strength (and perhaps then some)
for the next battles in its war on terrorism. Iran and North Korea, the two remaining members of
Bush's "Axis of Evil," seem to take the prospect of "regime change" seriously, and are racing to
develop nuclear weapons as insurance against American attack. The Bush administration's expressed
determination to eliminate breeding grounds for terrorism, while well-founded and vital for the
world's long-term security, is provoking short-term crises with these two nations. And the only way
out of either crisis may be war.
North Korea, the greater and more immediate threat, should be dealt with first. Whether it
will be dealt with first is another matter: the Bush administration has shown a reluctance to
deal forcefully with Kim Jong Il's regime, most likely because a Second Korean War would resemble
(or even eclipse) the First Korean War in terms of casualties (thirty-seven thousand American
dead). But waiting to deal decisively with a regime that seems bent on building a substantial
atomic arsenal could lead to a more destructive conflict than would be faced if action were taken
earlier.
It's true that North Korea probably already possesses a pair of atomic bombs. The thought of one
of them landing atop Seoul or Tokyo in retaliation for an American strike on the North's Yongbyon
reprocessing plant should certainly make one pause. But the prospect of eight North Korean nukes
(the original two plus the six that could be made from the North's eight thousand spent fuel rods)
should not make one pause, but move one to take decisive action. With eight or more bombs, North
Korea would not only have a deterrent against attack, but an additional inventory that it could sell
on the world market to the highest bidder. This must not be allowed to become reality.
Now that there is evidence (in the form of elevated levels of Krypton-85 along the DMZ) that
North Korea is operating a second, secret reprocessing facility in addition to the one at Yongbyon,
a pre-emptive strike at the North's nuclear production capabilities is out of the question (you
can't hit if you can't find it). The only other options left to the United States are outright
invasion (not only militarily daunting but politically impossible after the failure to find evidence
of WMD in occupied Iraq), or blockade.
The blockade option of course recalls Kennedy's successful tactic during the Cuban Missile Crisis of
forty years ago. While the stakes are lower in this crisis (North Korea doesn't have the ability
to destroy the world), they are still extremely high. Backed into a corner, his people starved for
food and his self starved for cash, Kim Jong Il might decide to go out in a flash of glory. The tactic
of offering refuge to a doomed dictator, which failed with Saddam Hussein, could very well work with
Kim and avert a catastrophe (Kim's subjects have been thoroughly brainwashed into thinking well of
him, and China or Russia could provide the exiled dictator with adequate protection against anyone who
doesn't think well of him).
Iran presents less scarier scenarios. While exile for that nation's theocrats wouldn't
be practical, invasion just might be (especially considering the fact that Iran is still a ways from
developing a nuclear deterrent). The invasion of Iraq might have hurt American credibility, but at
least it's put a substantial ground force next door (a force that, again, won't be leaving any time
soon). And Iran is not Iraq or North Korea: the factions currently running the country just might
step down voluntarily in favor of moderates if they're faced with a clear and imminent threat of
invasion. The primary thing the United States wants to avoid in Iran is making its allies look like
American stooges (just ask Tony Blair).
As I've written this, I've been filled with some small measure of hope that things can turn out
for the best in the end; that these twin threats can be eliminated peacefully;
that the world might actually end up more secure that it was two years ago. But it's still a small
measure: what can go wrong often does, and rationality is in the eye of the beholder. Before the
year is out, both crises will have reached their moments of decision, and the
world will either be faced with two new tumors of the terror cancer, or two new allies in the
struggle to make the world a safer place.
